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This study investigates how induced relative status affects satisfaction with different
relative payoffs. We find that participants with lower status are more satisfied with
disadvantageous payoff inequalities than equal or higher status participants. In contrast,
when receiving an advantageous payoff, status does not affect satisfaction. Our findings
suggest that relative social status has important implications for the acceptance of income
inequalities.
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INTRODUCTION
Income is considered an important factor for job satisfaction
(Clark and Oswald, 1996; Boyce et al., 2010). But how do
people arrive at valuations of income? According to previous
literature, two main factors influence this evaluation process:
Self-serving preferences and fairness considerations (e.g., Adams,
1965; Diekmann et al., 1997; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; van
den Bos et al., 2006).
Self-serving preferences are based on what pleases people and
what they evaluate positively, as for example a salary increase
(Messick and Sentis, 1979, 1983; van den Bos et al., 2006).
Fairness considerations, on the other hand, take into account
the outcomes of other people, as for example a colleague’s salary
(Adams, 1965; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Falk and Fischbacher,
2006). I may prefer a higher to a lower salary, but at the same time
consider it unfair to receive more than my colleague who does the
same job. In this case, a self-serving preference for money collides
with beliefs about what is fair and right: Satisfaction with a salary
increase is affected positively because more money is preferred to
less money, but it is also affected negatively, because it is consid-
ered unfair to receive more than a colleague (van den Bos et al.,
2006).
If we consider an example in which my colleague and not I
would receive a salary increase although we do the same work,
I might regard the situation as both non-self-serving and unfair.
Thus, there would be two sources of negative affect which both
reduce my satisfaction with this outcome (van den Bos et al.,
1997, 1998, 2006).
A number of studies show that, accordingly, satisfaction with
advantageous inequity (i.e., receiving more money than another
person) is higher than satisfaction with disadvantageous inequity
(i.e., receiving less money than another person); (Buunk and van
Yperen, 1989; van den Bos et al., 1997, 1998, 2006; Peters et al.,
2008). In line with this, when both my colleague and I would
receive a salary increase for the same work, I should be more
satisfied than in either of the two aforementioned examples: I
receive money and the monetary allocation is fair (e.g., Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; van den Bos et al.,
2006).
So far, only a few studies have investigated the influence of
social context, such as the relationship to the person with whom
the income comparison takes place (Loewenstein et al., 1989;
Gächter and Riedl, 2006; Peters and van den Bos, 2008; Peters
et al., 2008). Loewenstein et al. (1989) showed that this relationship
indeed does affect satisfaction: In friendly relationships, people
disliked receiving a higher payoff than their opponent. When the
relationship was antagonistic, people did not care about the payoff
of their opponent, as long as it was less than or equal to their own.
Results by Peters et al. (2008) support these findings: In their
study, people were less satisfied with advantageous inequity when
their opponent was a close friend compared to a stranger. This
suggests that people take social context into account when rating
one’s satisfaction, with fairness considerations playing a bigger
role when the relationship with the other person is positive.
An important component of social context that only few stud-
ies have considered is social status; although it is suggested to
play a crucial role in distributive justice (Lind and Tyler, 1988;
Ellemers et al., 1999; Blanz et al., 2011). Social status has been
shown to influence, for example, an individual’s engagement in
pro- and anti-social behavior (Piff et al., 2010, 2012), perceptions
of deservingness (Ellemers et al., 1999; Hong and Bohnet, 2007)
and even life satisfaction (Boyce et al., 2010). Several studies have
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further shown that status is strongly associated with increased
economic benefits and entitlements. For example, high status
participants have been found to receive higher outcomes in bar-
gaining games (Ball and Eckel, 1997; Ball et al., 2001), and to
be punished less for unsocial behavior (von Essen and Ranehill,
2012), than low status participants.
However, little is known about how relative status affects sat-
isfaction with payoff allocations. The present study investigates
this question systematically, by varying status (higher, same, and
lower) and payoff allocations (advantageous, equal, and disad-
vantageous) within pairs of individuals.
In line with previous research, we expect satisfaction with
advantageous inequity to be higher than satisfaction with disad-
vantageous inequity in general (Buunk and van Yperen, 1989; van
den Bos et al., 1997, 1998, 2006; Peters et al., 2008).
Status might further moderate satisfaction in different ways.
First, subjects might use status in general to justify a neglect
of fairness considerations, and thereby increase their satisfac-
tion with unequal payoff allocations. Self-serving preferences for
money would then have more weight and satisfaction with advan-
tageous payoffs would be rated higher. The direction of relative
status (i.e., higher or lower) should not play a role in this case;
just the fact of having another status than the opponent would
imply a higher satisfaction (cf. ingroup–outgroup effects; Brewer,
1979; Tajfel et al., 2006; Volz et al., 2009). Second, subjects might
use status to justify their satisfaction while taking the direction
of relative status into account (Hinkle and Brown, 1990). In
this case, a higher status entitles to more and thus, satisfaction
with an advantageous payoff would be higher when one pos-
sesses a higher status, and lower when the opponent possesses
a higher status. Accordingly, the satisfaction with a disadvan-
tageous payoff would be higher when one possesses a lower
status, and lower when the opponent possesses a lower status.
Third, the influence of status could also be asymmetric such
that subjects, when disadvantaged, take status into account in
order to reduce the negative affect of receiving less money and
being treated unfairly. When advantaged, subjects may be less
negatively affected and hence feel no need to take status into
account.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Previous literature indicates that men’s behavior is more sensitive
to status than women’s behavior (e.g., Huberman et al., 2004).
Thus, we invited only men to participate. We ran six sessions in
which in total 133 subjects (i.e., on average 22 subjects per ses-
sion; mean age 25 years) participated. Participants were recruited
via ORSEE (Greiner et al., 2003). The study was conducted in
the BonnEconLab in Germany in accordance with institutional
and national ethics guidelines and regulations. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants. Participants were seated in
cubicles and the experiment was presented on individual com-
puter screens, programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) All
participants received EUR 4 for participating. In addition one
of the 15 payoff allocations, as described below, was randomly
chosen for payment. Participants on average earned EUR 24
(∼USD 31).
MATERIAL AND PROCEDURE
In the experiment we first induced relative status. In a second step,
subjects were confronted with different payoff allocations which
they had to evaluate.
Relative status was induced by means of a trivia quiz which
consisted of 30 questions, each presented with four alternative
answers of which only one was correct (For example: “How
fast does Pluto move in its orbit around the sun? (A) 5.7 km/s,
(B) 6.1 km/s, (C) 6.8 km/s or (D) 4.7,km/s.” The quiz in its full
length is displayed in the Appendix.) Based on the total quiz
score, participants were assigned to three different groups: a low,
a medium, and a high score group, which served as our status
groups. The four highest-scoring participants of each experi-
mental session were allocated to the high score group, the four
lowest scoring participants were allocated to the low score group,
and the remaining participants were allocated to the medium
score group. Accordingly, the medium score group consisted of
the 16 to 20 participants per session who scored lower than
the high score group but higher than the low score group;
and who scored similarly as participants of their own group.
In total, 24 subjects were allocated to the high and the low
score groups respectively, whereas the medium score group com-
prised 85 participants. Thus, we could fully vary status in all
directions within individuals in themedium score group, i.e., sub-
jects from this group would face subjects from a higher scoring
group, subjects from their own group, and subjects from a lower
scoring group. Participants were aware of how groups were con-
structed, although the word “status” was not mentioned to them.
(Instructions are provided in the Appendix).
In order to manipulate social status in a laboratory setting,
previous studies have used random assignments to high and low
status groups, as well as assignments using scores from trivia quiz.
Scores from a trivia quiz have been used to induce status that
was—or that participants believed to be—dependent on ability
(Ball et al., 2001; Gächter and Riedl, 2006). In a direct comparison
of both assignment procedures, Ball et al. (2001) found similar
results for both random status and status participants believed to
be ability-dependent: Participants with higher status earned more
in a bargaining game than participants with lower status. In our
experiment, we use a difficult multiple choice quiz to create a sta-
tus based on a mixture of ability (knowing the correct answers)
and chance (guessing the correct answers). We consider this is
an appropriate way to induce status, given that, when acquiring
status, both ability and coincidence possibly play an important
role.
In the second part of the study, which followed right after com-
pletion of the first, we measured subjects’ satisfaction with dif-
ferent payoff allocations between themselves and other subjects.
Each subject was presented with a series of payoff allocations,
and asked to rate each allocation on a scale ranging from −5
to +5. More specifically, participants were asked: “How happy
are you with the following payoff allocation between you and
the other participant?” For each allocation, a star indicated who
scored higher on the quiz. If no star appeared both participants
belonged to the same score group. We used the star, since this
symbol is commonly associated with a higher rank; for instance
in military, or in the hotel and restaurant businesses (cp. Zink
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et al., 2008). Participants were explicitly told that “the size of the
payoff is independent of the quiz result.”
In total, all participants were presented with the same 15 pay-
off allocations in random order. Only in the medium score group
(intermediate status group), subjects were presented with allo-
cations between themselves and higher, same, as well as lower
status group subjects. Subjects from the high score group (high
status group) and the low score group (low status group) were
only presented with payoff allocations between themselves and
lower or higher status participants, respectively. They are ana-
lyzed separately, serving as a robustness check for our main
results. In our main analyses, we concentrate on the interme-
diate status group and herein on the allocations in which the
participant himself always received EUR 20 (Table 1). We do
so in order to hold absolute own payoff constant and hence
avoid effects of absolute income. This yields two factors (Status
and Payoff Allocation) and allows us to compare all possi-
ble combinations between higher, same and lower status and
advantageous, equitable and disadvantageous payoff allocations,
respectively.
RESULTS
Our variable of interest is the satisfaction rating of individuals
from the intermediate group since only this group faced oppo-
nents from all three status groups. (See Methods section; analyses
of the high and low status groups can be found in the Appendix.
We find a similar result pattern as for the intermediate status
groups).
We conducted an ANOVA with the two within-subject factors
Status (lower, same, higher) and Payoff Allocation (disadvanta-
geous, equitable, advantageous). Significant main and interaction
effects of these factors were further studied with pair-wise com-
parisons (Sidak-corrected for multiple comparisons).
The ANOVA yields a significant main effect of Status
[F(1.785, 149.947) = 29.724, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.261], a sig-
nificant main effect of Payoff Allocation [F(1.500, 125.961) =
62.652, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.427], and an interaction effect
of the two factors [F(3.390, 284.742) = 10.143, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.108]. Results of the pair-wise comparisons (corrected for
multiple comparisons) are displayed in Table 2 and are discussed
below. Figure 1 provides an overview of the results, including
means and standard errors (SE).
Table 1 | Payoff allocations in EUR.
Social status information Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs
(D) (E) (A) (D) (A)
You:Him*(lower status) 20:30 20:20 20:10 10:20 30:20
You:Him (same status) 20:30 20:20 20:10 10:20 30:20
You*:Him (higher status) 20:30 20:20 20:10 10:20 30:20
D, disadvantageous; A, advantageous; E, equitable. *For each allocation, a star
indicated who scored higher on the quiz. Only allocations in which the subject
himself received EUR 20 (boldface) were entered in the analyses. To prevent
subjects from repeatedly seeing the exact same monetary amounts, we varied
the rewards within a 10% interval from the mean.
SATISFACTION WITH PAYOFF ALLOCATIONS ACROSS STATUS
CATEGORIES
As Figure 1 shows, disadvantageous payoffs are rated as less satis-
factory than advantageous and equitable payoffs, irrespective of
relative status [F(1.407, 59.104) = 27.566, p < 0.001, partial η2 =
0.396] Pair-wise comparisons of the payoffs (Sidak-corrected for
multiple comparisons) yield significant differences between both
disadvantageous and advantageous (p < 0.001) as well as dis-
advantageous and equitable payoffs (p < 0.001). Yet, equitable
payoffs are not rated as more satisfactory than advantageous pay-
offs (Sidak-corrected pairwise comparision, p = 0.588). Table 2
shows that this is also the case when taking into account satisfac-
tion ratings of the same status category (which should be closest
to social comparison studies without a status manipulation)
only.
Table 2 | P-values of pairwise comparisons (Sidak-corrected for
multiple comparisons) of satisfaction ratings between different
payoff allocations and different status categories.
Social status Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction
information D-E D-A E-A
P P P
Lower status <0.001 <0.001 0.950
Same status <0.001 <0.001 0.998
Higher status <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Satisfaction with Lower-same Lower-higher Same-higher
status status status
P P P
Payoff (D) 0.001 <0.001 0.060
Payoff (E) 0.990 <0.001 <0.001
Payoff (A) 0.887 0.994 0.948
D, disadvantageous; A, advantageous; E, equitable. Significant results (p < 0.05)
are in boldface.
FIGURE 1 | The x-axis displays the relative payoffs and the y-axis
displays average satisfaction ratings concerning these relative payoffs.
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THE INFLUENCE OF STATUS ON SATISFACTION WITH DIFFERENT
PAYOFF ALLOCATIONS
The influence of relative status on satisfaction ratings shows a
striking asymmetry: While status affects satisfaction when payoffs
are disadvantageous, it does not affect satisfaction when pay-
offs are advantageous (see Figure 1 and Table 2 for statistics).
Satisfaction ratings for disadvantageous inequity differ between
all status categories, with highest ratings when subjects are in
the lower status category and lowest ratings when they are in the
higher status category.
Figure 1 further shows that for equitable payoffs, ratings do
not differ between the same and the lower status categories, but
are lower when participants are in the higher status category.
THE INFLUENCE OF STATUS ON SATISFACTION ACROSS PAYOFF
ALLOCATIONS
When we further compare satisfaction ratings across relative pay-
off allocations, we find that individuals with lower status are, in
general, more satisfied (mean: 2.09) than higher status individuals
(mean: 1.09); [F(1, 84) = 42.420; p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.336].
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we investigated the influence of status on sat-
isfaction with different payoff allocations. In this section, we will
first discuss the overall effect of payoff allocations on satisfaction
across status categories. Second, we will discuss the asymmetric
influence of status; while it affects satisfaction when payoffs are
disadvantageous, it does not seem to affect status when payoffs are
advantageous. Concluding, we will discuss the finding that satis-
faction with payoffs in general is higher when subjects are of lower
compared to higher status.
SATISFACTION WITH PAYOFF ALLOCATIONS ACROSS STATUS
CATEGORIES
Disadvantageous payoffs are rated as less satisfactory than advan-
tageous and equitable payoffs, irrespective of relative status. This
finding supports previous studies showing that equitable payoffs
are preferred to disadvantageous payoffs (e.g., Loewenstein et al.,
1989) and that fairness considerations are asymmetric; disadvan-
tageous inequity is less satisfactory than advantageous inequity
(e.g., Buunk and van Yperen, 1989; van den Bos et al., 2006;
Peters and van den Bos, 2008). In contrast, equitable payoffs are
not rated as more satisfactory than advantageous payoffs; this is
the case across status categories as well as within the same status
category only. There is evidence in the literature supporting this
finding (e.g., Austin et al., 1980), but there also exists contradict-
ing evidence showing that equitable payoffs are more satisfactory
than advantageous payoffs (e.g., Buunk and van Yperen, 1989;
van den Bos et al., 2006). Yet, our result is in line with the assump-
tion that receiving more than another person is valued more
positively than it is considered unfair. It has been shown that peo-
ple prefer downward comparisons, i.e., it makes them feel better
to compare themselves to people who are worse off (Festinger,
1954; Wills, 1981). Further, satisfaction seems to be higher the
higher one’s income is compared to the income of others (Clark
and Oswald, 1996; Boyce et al., 2010). A neuroimaging study by
Fliessbach et al. (2007) further supports this suggestion; they find
activation in the nucleus accumbens, a brain area associated with
subjective value encoding, to be positively related to the ratio
between a person’s own income and other’s income.
THE INFLUENCE OF STATUS ON SATISFACTION WITH DIFFERENT
PAYOFF ALLOCATIONS
The influence of relative status on satisfaction ratings supports
our third hypothesis since it shows a striking asymmetry: While
status affects satisfaction when payoffs are disadvantageous,
it does not affect satisfaction when payoffs are advantageous.
Subjects might feel entitled to less than another person when they
have lower status and thus are more satisfied. However, this seems
not to be the case when subjects are advantaged.
A possible explanation is that receiving a lower relative pay-
off, which is neither self-serving nor fair, triggers a negative affect,
which can be reduced by taking status into account. Yet, receiving
a higher payoff does not trigger a negative affect since it serves
an individual’s self-interest. Thus, status is not taken into account
when receiving a higher payoff.
Ratings of equitable payoff allocations stand in contrast
to both ratings of disadvantageous and advantageous payoffs:
Ratings do not differ between the same and the lower status cat-
egory, but are lower in the higher status category. This suggests
that participants do ignore status information when it is nega-
tive (i.e., when they have lower status), but feel entitled to more
when status information is positive (i.e., when they have higher
status). A possible explanation could be that people tend to inte-
grate positive information better than negative information (see
literature on selective perception/the good-news–bad-news effect,
e.g., Bradley, 1978; Lord et al., 1979; Babcock and Loewenstein,
1997; Eil and Rao, 2011; Sharot et al., 2012).
Ingroup effects might also play a role; same status partic-
ipants might be considered the ingroup, whereas participants
with higher or lower status might be considered outgroup mem-
bers. Empirical studies show that an ingroup is favored over an
outgroup when it comes to the distribution of rewards or the
evaluation of the groups’ characteristics (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Tajfel
et al., 2006; Volz et al., 2009). However, in our study in-/outgroup
effects cannot fully explain the results, since satisfaction rat-
ings are asymmetric: Satisfaction in comparisons to lower status
subjects differs from satisfaction in comparisons to higher sta-
tus subjects. This indicates that status affects satisfaction beyond
manipulating mere group belonging.
THE INFLUENCE OF STATUS ON SATISFACTION ACROSS PAYOFF
ALLOCATIONS
The finding that individuals are in general more satisfied with
their payoffs when they have lower compared to higher status sug-
gests that being of inferior social status yields a higher acceptance
of disadvantageous income inequalities.
The reasons for why lower status leads to higher payoff sat-
isfaction are manifold. In a seminal article, Keltner et al. (2003)
discuss the effects of power on psychological variables, such as
affect, prosociality and sensitivity for reward. Although power is
not the same as status, the constructs are related (e.g., French and
Raven, 1959) and might have similar effects. Thus, it is possible
that having a high status in our study leads to a high need for
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reward and accordingly to lower satisfaction ratings for disadvan-
tageous payoffs. Further, a high status might decrease prosociality
and fairness considerations, also leading to a negative effect on
satisfaction. Yet the relationship between power and status in this
study remains speculative. Further, in our study, status was varied
within subject; hence, the aforementioned effects of status would
have had to occur within person over the course of less than half
an hour. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that status affects the
aforementioned variables. Future research is necessary to discover
the reasons for differences in satisfaction ratings.
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF OUR STUDY
Although our setup has the advantage of varying status within
subject in a controlled laboratory setting, we acknowledge that
the artificial nature of this procedure might limit its interpretabil-
ity with regard to the effects of real-life status. It would therefore
be highly interesting to investigate the influence of real-life sta-
tus differences on payoff satisfaction in the field and compare
these findings to the results from controlled laboratory studies
as the present one. This would combine the advantages of both
approaches and hence increase the interpretability of the present
data.
As another consequence of our experimental setting, we can-
not completely rule out an experimenter demand effect, since
status information was explicitly given by displaying an asterisk
and thus might have led subjects to assume that the experimenter
wanted them to incorporate this information in their satisfaction
ratings. However, such an effect is unlikely to have occurred for
two reasons. First, subjects were explicitly informed that payoffs
were not related to performance. Second, the results showed a
strong asymmetry. If an experimenter demand effect would have
occurred, we would have expected it to be symmetric; i.e., that
status has an effect on satisfaction ratings not only when subjects
are disadvantaged, but also when they are advantaged.
In our study, status was derived from some sort of performance
(knowledge) measure and subjects were informed that payoffs
were not related to performance. Furthermore, questions in our
quiz were designed in a way that accuracy depended on luck more
than on actual ability. However, we cannot rule out that subjects
may have believed that payoffs were justified by differences in per-
formance. Previous studies suggest that this most likely has no
impact, because they have shown that, irrespective of whether sta-
tus depended on performance or luck, higher status individuals
earned more money during a bargaining game than lower status
subjects (Ball and Eckel, 1997; Ball et al., 2001). Nevertheless, we
suggest that future research should address the impact of status
information which is derived from a completely arbitrary mea-
sure (such as dice rolls) or from highly ability related measures in
different contexts.
Further, since satisfaction was measured via self-reports, there
is a possibility that subjects may have not revealed their true feel-
ings. Thus, instead of actually being more satisfied, lower status
people may simply have felt not entitled to complain as much
as higher status people. Accordingly, lower status people might
have stated to be more satisfied than they actually were. To reduce
the chance that subjects would not reveal their actual preferences,
future studies could follow up on Ball and Eckel (1997) and use
monetary incentives; e.g., by letting higher and lower status sub-
jects play bargaining games and thus let behavior affect payoffs.
Further, neuroscientific investigations could shed light on the
influence of status on actual payoff preferences by identifying the
neural correlates of the underlying cognitive processes instead of
relying on self-reports.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Altogether, our findings may not fully explain, but contribute to
an explanation of why economic inequality is often accepted and
persists in most societies.
Our results further highlight an important shortcoming of
existing research on relative income; the study of social context in
terms of status. Future research should include status and other
types of social context in empirical studies and in psychological
and economic models of social preferences such as equity and
fairness concerns (Adams, 1965; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006).
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APPENDIX
A1. TRIVIA QUIZ
1. How long is the longest highway in the world?
7000 miles
8000 miles
9000 miles
6000 miles
2. How long is the English channel?
612 kilometers
564 kilometers
551 kilometers
627 kilometers
3. Where do you find the largest bell in the world?
Tsar Kolokol, Kremlin, MoscowGreat Bell of Kyoto, Chion-In
Temple, Kyoto
Liberty Bell, Liberty Bell Center, Philadelphia
Big Ben, St. Stephen’s Tower, London
4. Which country is the primary producer of news print in the
world?
USA
Great Britain
Japan
Canada
5. The Vinson Massif is the highest mountain of which conti-
nent?
Antarctica
North America
Australia
Africa
6. World record speed attained in a helicopter?
239mph
198mph
249mph
158mph
7. How much did it cost to run the BBC website 2002?
72 million Pound
65 million Pound
59 million Pound
48 million Pound
8. The royal mint is recognized as the oldest established
business in the UK—what year?
1886
1897
1901
1902
9. How many nuclear reactors are there in the UK?
35
40
45
50
10. In post World War II general elections, in which year did
the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom achieve its
highest ever number of votes?
1989
1990
1991
1992
11. In what year was 3rd Class rail travel abolished in the UK ?
1958
1957
1956
1955
12. Braxy is a fatal bacterial infection in which animal?
Cow
Horse
Sheep
Pig
13. Who became president of Uganda after Idi Amin was
overthrown in 1980?
Milton Obote.
BenedictoKiwanuka
Paulo Muwanga
Tito Okello
14. How much water falls down the 54m high Niagara falls per
second?
1000m3
1500m3
2000m3
2500m3
15. How fast does Pluto move in its orbit around the sun?
4,7 km/s
5.7 km/s
6.1 km/s
6.8 km/s
16. The group ABBA is one of Swedens most wellknown pop
groups. How many records have they sold by now?
300 million
400 million
500 million
600 million
17. Which of these animals walk like a camel?
The cat
The dog
The sheep
The horse
18. Which country is the world’s leading egg producer?
Japan
China
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Vietnam
Korea
19. Which of these countries have most tractors per capita?
Iceland
Canada
Japan
Australia
20. What is the least popular month for U.S. weddings?
January
February
November
December
21. How many days does a cat usually stay in heat?
Five
Six
Seven
Eight
22. How many known poisonous birds are there in the world?
None
One
Two
Three
23. What’s the first word uttered in film Citizen Kane?
Rosebud
Xanadu
Kane
Susan
24. What European nation consumes more spicy Mexican food
than any other?
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Norway
25. Buckminster Fuller’s innovative inventor’s Dymaxion car
could carry eleven passengers, exceed 120mph and get 30
miles per gallon in what year was this?
1937
1934
1928
1927
26. In what year did the boxer George Foreman make his first
title defense in 21 years?
1994
1995
1996
1997
27. How hot is the core of the sun, in degrees Farenheit?
32,000,000 degrees Fahrenheit
27,000,000 degrees Fahrenheit
20,000,000 degrees Fahrenheit
18,000,000 degrees Fahrenheit
28. In what year did London loose 4,000 people to a “killer fog”
of carbon dioxide?
1949
1952
1954
1955
29. How many days can an ant survive under water?
One
Two
Three
Four
30. What is the maximum flight speed of a Boeing 747–300
jetliner?
611 miles per hour
599 miles per hour
583 miles per hour
488 miles per hour
How much does the Eiffel tower weigh in tons? _________1
A2: RESULTS OF HIGH AND LOW STATUS GROUPS
Table A1 shows the effect of status and relative income on satis-
faction in the high and low status groups.
A3: INSTRUCTIONS (STAGE 1)
Thanks for participating in this study in economics!
Please read the following instructions carefully. They contain
everything you need to know in order to participate in the study.
If you have any questions after having read the text below, please
raise your hand and we will come to you.
You will be presented with 40 questions one after the other
on the computer screen. These questions could be perceived as
difficult, but we ask you to think it through and give each question
a try. In case you have no idea, make your best guess and choose
one of the alternatives. Most people will not know the answer to
any of these questions, but have to guess. To answer a question you
simply click on the alternative that you think is correct. The next
question will then appear automatically. There is no time limit for
answering a question, so you can take as much time you need for
answering each question.
Please wait after you have finished all questions. The second
part of today’s study will start soon.
A4: INSTRUCTIONS (STAGE 2)
Please read the following instructions carefully. They contain
everything you need to know for your participation. Should you
1If participants’ scores turned out to be equal in the multiple-choice quiz, we
used this question as a tie-breaker.
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Table A1 | Mean satisfaction ratings and p-values in high status group (i.e., Subjects face lower status only).
Social status information Mean satisfaction Satisfaction D-E Satisfaction D-A Satisfaction E-A
MD ME MA T p T p T p
Higher status −1.63 0.96 2.42 −5.327 <0.001 −5.769 <0.001 −1.904 0.070
Degrees of freedom (df) = 23 for all comparisons. D, disadvantageous; A, advantageous; E, equitable.
Table A2 | Mean satisfaction ratings and p-values in low status group (i.e., Subjects face higher status only).
Social status information Mean satisfaction Satisfaction D-E Satisfaction D-A Satisfaction E-A
MD ME MA T p T p T p
Lower status 1.83 2.88 2.92 −1.894 0.071 −1.919 0.067 −0.095 0.925
Degrees of freedom (df) = 23 for all comparisons. D, disadvantageous; A, advantageous; E, equitable.
have any questions after having read the text below please raise
your hand and we will come to you to answer your question.
Now, in a number of settings, you will be randomly paired
with different persons who also participated in the questionnaire
in part 1 of this study. In each trial you will be presented with
monetary amounts for you and the other person.
In detail you will, before every setting, be asked to click on a
gray rectangle. Through this procedure it will be randomly deter-
mined what other person will be your counterpart in the trial, and
consecutively how much you and this other person will receive.
The size of the payoff is independent of the quiz result.
As soon as you clicked on the rectangle, it will become clear
who are playing with. For instance, it may then read: “Please press
a button to see the amount the other person* will receive and the
amount you will receive.” A star is used to indicate the player who
scored higher in the quiz. When, as in this example, a star appears
behind “the other person,” it means that he had a higher score
than you on the quiz. If, on the other hand, the star appears after
the “you,” it means that you were the player with the higher score.
When there is neither an asterisk behind “the other person” nor
behind the “you,” it means that you both performed about equally
well on the quiz. When you will press a button now, two amounts
will be presented, one will be allotted to the other person, and one
will be allotted to you.
The stars are presented according to the quiz score. There will
be three groups. One group consists of the four participants with
the highest scores. Another group consists of the four participants
with the lowest scores. The remaining participants, whose scores
are between those of the four best and four worst participants,
also form a group. So when there is no star displayed, it means
you and your opponent are in the same group.When there is a star
behind “the other person,” this means that your opponent is from
a better group. A star behind “you” means that your opponent is
from a worse group.
Afterwards, you will be asked to press a button. After you did
this, two monetary rewards are displayed. One of the rewards will
be for the other person and one will be for you. Then a scale will
be presented on which you shall evaluate how satisfied you were
with the allocation of the amounts. If you choose “−5,” thismeans
you are very unsatisfied, a “0” means you are neither satisfied
nor unsatisfied, and an “+5” means you are very satisfied. Other
numbers accordingly mean an in-between value on the scale.
This is how the scale looks:
This session will last approximately 20min.
After the study is over, one of the trials you faced will be
randomly chosen. You will be paid according to the outcome
in this trial. The drawing of the trial that will actually be paid
is random and independent of how satisfied you were. The
other person of this trial will also receive money according to
the amount which was displayed next to his initials. The draw
will be random, and although it is possible that “the other
person” presented to you is repeatedly the same, it will be guar-
anteed that every person, including you, will only receive one
payment.
If you have any questions, please ask them now. Otherwise
please wait until we will tell you when to start.
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